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From Paradigm to Paradim Shift:
The Military and Operations Other
Than War
Clemson G. Turregano & Ricky Lynn Waddell
United States Military Academy
The purpose of military forces is combat, that is to deter
and to defeat the enemus of the United States; that is
their central mission, their raison d'etre, the only
justification for expending resources on their creation and
maintenance.
Samuel Huntington 1

Beware of Foreign Entanglements
George Washington
These might well be the watchwords of the anned forces officer
when presented with missions referred to in Department of Defense
(DoD) parlance as Operations Other Than War (OOTW). OOTW
includes, but is not limited to: "nation assistance, security and advisory
assistance, counterdrug operations, anns control, treaty verification,
support to domestic civil authorities, and peacekeeping. "2 More often
than not, OOTW involves intervention in another nation's political
situation.
American military officers, in general, have an ambivalent, if not
The authors would like to thank the Department of Social Sciences at the
United States Military Academy, especially Colonels Jim Golden, Dan
Kaufman, Fred Black, and Joe Collins for their support and guidance. We
also thank the Army Research Institute for their financial support
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not purport to
reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department
of the Army, or the Department of Defense.
1 Samuel Huntington, "Non-Traditional Roles for the U.S. Military, "
Non-CombaJ Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post Cold War Era, James
Graham, ed (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press 1993) 5.
2FM100-5, Operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army 1993) 20.
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negative attitude towards OOTW. This outlook results from a variety
of organizational and operational reasons. This article examines why
American armed forces are hesitant to accept OOTW missions. First,
the article clarifies areas of concern by concentrating on organizational
attitudes from an officer's perspective. Second, the discussion addresses
how the doctrine is changing to meet current international realities
regarding OOTW, while simultaneously addressing organizational
concerns.
Officers do not feel OOTW is useless or irrelevant. OOTW is a
necessity in a world that may produce conflicts over scarce resources,
rising ethnicity, religion, or resurgent nationalism. 3 Wars generated by
these hatreds have no borders, no respect for basic humanity, and are
exceptionally ruthless. In addition , these conflicts are usually internal
and regional. They do not pose overt external threats. The regionality,
ethnicity. and lack of borders involved in these wars pose significant
challenges for planners, which in tum heightens the concern by
American officers towards involvement.
DoD will always accept the missions passed down by the National
Command Authority, but the military leaders who advise elected leaders
will voice their concerns towards OOTW based on three
behavioral/historical themes: the desire for concrete victory conditions,
the desire to have a concrete definition of how firepower is to be used to
achieve operational objectives, and the need for political and popular
support. In short, their concerns revolve around victory , violence, and
Vietnam .4
The leaders' concerns about OOTW should not be taken as
recalcitrance. Given the decision to execute OOTW, the Army has the
ability to execute the mission due to years spent developing a doctrine
enabling forces to execute OOTW with maximum effectiveness and
minimum casualties . This doctrine, though lacking in certain respects ,
reflects an able attempt to address the officer's concerns towards OOTW.
3For an excellent look inside the problems creating the conditions for
low -intensity conflict, see John Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The
Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, p. 44-60. Mr . Kaplan admirably applies
and interprets other distinguished authors, such as Martin Van Creveld,
John Keegan, Samuel Huntington, and Thomas Fraser Homer -Dixon,
weaving them into a bleak, if not accurate, picture of the future.
4 The Clinton Administration shares these concerns. Anthony Lake, the
President's National Security Advisor, recently stated in "The Limits to
Peacekeeping, " New York Times, February 6, 1994, p. 17, that the
administration will ask tough questions before becoming involved in any
United Nations Peace Operation . These questions include, "What is the
threat to our interests ? Is there a clearly defined mission? A distinct end
point? How much will it cost? Are the resource s available? What is the
likelihood of success?"
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Cognitive barriers to OOTW
Examining any organization is a difficult task.5 For our purposes,
this article confines itself to the officer level. "The officer corps is the
active directing element of the military structure and is responsible for
the military security of society." 6 To fully understand the American
disposition towards peacekeeping operations, and more specifically,
OOTW, the reader needs to understand the issue from the perspective of
the professional military officer.
There are three conceptual foundations for the officer's concern
towards OOTW;
1) The American military is an organization centered and
formed upon victory in battle.
2)

3)

In general , officers view themselves as warriors, or,
using a contemporary term, managers of violence .
Most operations within OOTW do not fit within that
definition.
'No More Vietnams.' The legitimacy of the armed
forces, and especially the Army, lay with people. 7 If
a mission is not supported by the population, how do
we justify involvement?

Few people outside the military comprehend the responsibilities of
officers in terms of the burden of leadership. According to FMI00-5,
Leaders have special challenges and responsibilities in
regard to soldiers. They successfully lead them
through danger, mold and protect their spirit, and
channel
their
energies
toward
mission
accomplishment. Leaders consider the physiological,
psychological, and ethical challenges soldiers will
face , providing them the proper training and
leadership that give them the will to fight. They
build units and teams that have the courage to
overcome odds to accomplish the mission and the
determination to press on to victory .8

5James

Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy (Basic Books 1989)
Samuel Huntington , The Soldier and the State : The Theory and Politics
of Civil -Military Relations (New York: Vantage 1957) 3.
7
Ibid .
8 FM 100-5, 14-1. FM represents Field Manual. FMI00 -5 describes and
define s the doctrinal foundation for Army Operations .
6
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Because of this responsibility, the officer becomes very close to the
soldiers under his or her command. This attachment relates not only to
the fraternal bond generated through the hardship of the profession, but
because any officer understands that soldiers are the key to victory.
Without disciplined, well trained and motivated soldiers, the best
equipment is worthless. Thus, risking a soldier's life is not done
frivolously or without reason.
Without a doubt, the best way to prepare soldiers is to train them
for battle. A common adage is "More sweat on the drill field leads to
less blood shed in battle." Before an officer trains soldiers, however, he
or she must have a mission in order to orient the training. Missionoriented training is critical to effective forces. Proper training is the
only way an officer can balance his duty to his soldiers, and his
responsibility to accomplish the mission. 9
To insure proper training is one reason an officer must ask probing
questions concerning any potential conflict. A clear definition of the
mission enables them to train and mentally prepare soldiers for conflict.
Officers want to know when they can declare victory. This clarification
helps planners reduce casualties and operate wisely, aiding the troops'
morale. Additionally, planners need to determine the amount of force to
use. They need to know the legal status of the conflict, and the amount
of support of the American people.
There is no substitute for Victory

(Douglas McArthur)

A noted international relations scholar once mentioned that the
reason the American Army does not get involved in peacekeeping
operations is that as a superpower Army, the American Army has
always been an Army of conquest -- it fights to win. 1 For most of the
wars of its history, the American Army, usually after some setbacks,
emerges victorious and forces the adversary into unconditional surrender.
Washington at Yorktown, Grant at Appomattox, Pershing at
Compeigne, and McArthur in Tokyo Bay are historic symbols that
represent the potential power and ultimate purpose of the American
armed forces.
This American bias is reinforced through doctrine which is based
strongly upon Clausewitz' school of Total War. According to
Clausewitz, in order to win,

°

9 For

greater insighl concerning trammg units for OOTW, see Steve
Vogel, 'Training for Macedonian Duties," Army Times, January 17, 1994,
p.30 .
10 Discussion with Professor Lily Ling, Washington D.C .. 2 September
1993.
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... the art of war tells us: go for the greatest, most
decisive purpose you can achieve; choose the surest
way to it that you dare to go. War should be
conducted with the utmost necessary or possible
degree of effort. 11
War is fought for a political purpose, " ...either to destroy the
enemy's state or dictate the terms of the peace." 12 You must,
therefore, capture your enemy's heart...defeat his core, destroy his
ability to wage war.
Americans have followed this principle in past wars. Sherman
demonstrated its potency in his 'March to the Sea' during the Civil War.
The Army pursued Total War again in the West, with the wars against
the Indians, annihilating total tribes and civilizations. In this century
the doctrine of strategic bombing campaigns and night raids laid waste
entire cities. 13 Strategic bombing, combined with armored thrusts
towards the enemy's heartland contributed to victory. Properly used, the
idea of depriving the enemy of its ability to fight can only leave one
side in control of the battlefield.
OOTW challenges the American officer's assumption of total war.
Former Chief of Staff Carl Vuono addressed the issue very succinctly.
At the end of Vuono's tenure, when it was clear that the Army would
face a sizable reduction and a reorientation to new missions, an officer
asked Vuono about the Army of the future and what bit of advice he
would leave to his successor. Vuono replied,
I'll tell you the purpose of the Army is to win the
wars of the nation. That's what the purpose of the
Army is. Don't let anybody give you nonsense about
peripheral issues or peripheral missions. Well it
would be nice if the Army did so and so. That may
be good for a cup of coffee down the hall here, to talk
about But don't spend more time than that on it. I
sure as hell wouldn'L.14

11'Strategie'

(1804) s.9 in Hahlweg (ed) Verstreute kleine Schriften, pp
14 - 16, quoted from Azar Gat, The Origins of Military Thought : From the
Enli~htenment to Clausewitz,(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989) 203.
1 Ibid, 204.
13These bombing raids, although invoking the spirit of Total War, were
aimed at reducing the enemy's potential for manufacturing war goods. The
British concept of night mass bombing was much more akin to total war
than the American policy.
14 Address to Pre-Command Course 91-9, 20 May 1991, Vuono Papers,
Speeches and Remarks, 9 May 1991-11 June 1991.
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As for the bit of advice, Vuono added,
The first one is beware of the good idea guys .... You
see, there's a lot of good idea fellows running
around .... Who have a great program that they just
think we got to institute in the Army. And watch the
peripheral missions. Okay? They don't contribute to
a trained and ready Army. 15
When Vuono spoke of fighting wars, he included short-term
actions like the interventions in Grenada and Panama. 16 That the
traditionalists still remained disdainful, however, of oLher low intensity
missions in this period is clear. This is particularly true of politically
ambiguous missions such as "nation-building,"
humanitarian
intervention, peacekeeping, and even counterinsurgency. 17
Being placed into a peacekeeping scenario is very difficult for an
American officer. An officer is trained to use firepower and maneuver
to defeat an enemy. This ability provides a beginning and ending point
for a battle or war. If a mission does not have a prescribed beginning,
means, and end, the officer is hesitant, for fear of being unable to
develop the focus needed to bring effective fire on the enemy. This
focus is critical for winning on the battlefield
Many will say the American military desires free reign to
accomplish anything they want on the battlefield. This is not entirely
correct. More important than indiscriminate violence is the focus of the
combat. What are the political objectives the government wants to
achieve? For the military officer, Lhegovernment's responsibility is to
establish the political boundaries within which the military can perform
its mission. "Operational and tactical commanders need to know the
non-military features of the conditions, and how to measure them in
order to take them into consideration as they plan for, conduct, and
evaluate the effectiveness of operations." 18 These boundaries provide
the focus for overall, strategic victory. These boundaries must be clear
15 Address to Pre-Command Course 91-9, 20 May 1991, Vuono Papers,
Speeches and Remarks, 9 May 1991-11 June 1991.
16 Telephone interview wilh General (retired) Carl E. Vuono, 16 August
1993.
17 The current administration supports this idea. As Anthony Lake
stated in his recent New York Times article, "Our armed forces' primary
mission is not to conduct peace operations, but to win wars. The bottom -up
review of our post -cold war defense requirements insures lhat we remain
prepared to do lhat."
18 S.L. Arnold and David T . Stahl, "A Power Projection Army m
Operations Olher Than War," Parameters, Winter 1993-1994, p.8.
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and they must be enforced. This does not mean they cannot be
modified.
During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the mission changed
from protecting Saudi Arabia to freeing Kuwait, but clear, new
boundaries were established along with the mission change. This
offered the military a new set of planning goals. The goals of the
destruction of the Iraqi Army and freedom of Kuwait dictated the
conditions for victory in the Gulf War. Of course, military planners
understand they may not always enjoy such a clear-cut definition of
combat, and thus must work in a more complex situation such as
Somalia. A complex situation does not remove the need for distinct
goals and objectives, including the conditions for victory.
The terms destruction and freedom, although primafacie opposites,
actually establish boundaries within which military planners can make
decisions concerning the use and focus of violence. With this as a
precedent, what will be the conditions for victory in, say, Bosnia?
According to French Lieutenant General Phillipe Morillon, former
deputy commander of the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia,
"The use of force without clear political objectives is something we
must avoid ." 19 The problem with OOTW is that it blurs the
requirements for and definition of victory.

Managers

of Violence

According to Samuel Huntington, an officer is a 'manager of
violence,'
...the function of a military force is successful armed
combat. The duties of a military officer include: (1)
the organizing, equipping, and training of his force,
(2) the planning of its activities; and (3) the direction
of its operation in and out of combat. The direction,
operation, and control of a human organization whose
primary function is the application of violence is the
peculiar skill of the officer .20
In the words of one officer, "no American commander wants to operate
under rules that state: 'Close with and destroy the enemy, but don't
shoot him too much. "' The idea of restraining the use of force
jeopardizes the mission, his organization, and his soldiers.
The mission in the Persian Gulf was compatible with the concept
19 For a synopsis of the problems with peacekeeping operation s, see,
see Sean D. Naylor, "Make Plan, Then Make Peace, " Army Times 14
February 1994, p. 26.
20 Huntington 11.
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of the manager of violence. Although fraught with peril, this type of
mission was accepted by the armed forces because it satisfied certain
doctrinal principles. It also satisfied certain organizational perceptions.
What are these perceptions? According to Carl Builder, " ...to find
the service's dominant concepts of war, one need look no further than
their finest hours ....of what experience is it most proud?" Builder goes
on to state that for the Army, "...its best memories of itself came in its
march across Central Europe in the last monLhs of the war [World War
11]....the Army showed itself to be a confident, effective, and robust war
machine, capable of taking and holding the initiative, demonstrating
courage, resilience and innovation." 21
Operation Desert Storm fit the World War II mold. The Persian
Gulf conflict was a classic example of the Army supporting
fundamental American principles, using the 'right' amount of force, to
subdue an oppressor. A ready and well-trained Army coupled with a
brilliant operational victory generated the new organizational symbol
for maintaining ability and victory. Operation Desert Storm upheld the
idea of organizational legitimacy through the idea of using force to
liberate the Kuwaiti people. Today, the informal goal for warfighters in
the Pentagon is to achieve another Desert Storm.
The planners developing the mission in Somalia were still jubilant
from the laurels they received for their contributions to the Desert
Storm victory. Somalia might not be the challenge posed by Desert
Storm, but it still afforded the opportunity to be the liberating Army,
using force for a good cause. The mission statement at the beginning
was very simple: 'Provide security for the delivery of relief supplies in
Somalia. '22 On its face, the mission seemed achievable: enter Somalia,
suppress the warlords, escort the foodstuffs, and return home. Given all
this, officers were still hesitant to accept the mission due to the hazy
definition of victory, and due to uncertainty about the amount of force
to be used. According to one officer, "Somalia is a tragedy that we can
make into an opportunity -- if the politicians will help us."
Officers seek the opportunity to resolve the dilemma of force and
justice -- 'how can we use force for a good cause?' If a potential conflict
does not lend itself to resolving this dilemma in any degree, the
military will remain hesitant. If there is no criteria for victory, the
civilian leadership presents the officer with two related questions: 1)
What type of threat am I training my troops to encounter, and 2) What
can I tell them and the operational planners the purpose of this mission
is?
Officers are concerned, and rightly so, that failure to define proper
21 Carl Builder, The Masks of War, (Baltimore,
Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1989) 131-134.
22F.M. Lorenz, "Law and Anarchy in Somalia," Parameters, Vol XXill
Winter 1993 - 94, p. 27.
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objectives may result in the improper management of violence -- too
much or too little. Too much might harm the local population
needlessly. Too little results in the problems such as the 3 October
ambush of the forces in Mogadishu in which 18 US Army Rangers
were killed. As Marine Lieutenant General Robert Johnston stated,
"[W]hat appeared to be a simple mission of getting food to starving
Somalis turned out to be much more complicated. "23 Failure to
consider critical aspects of violence and victory, and the resulting
impact upon support from home leads one to problems similar to the
ones encountered during Vietnam.

No more Vietnams
The 'Vietnam Syndrome' as George Bush called it, is still very
prevalent within the military community . The spectre of 'another
Vietnam' raises its ugly head every time the United States becomes
involved in a conflict, especially those involving civil war or internal
unrest. To be successful, an operation must have not only force, and
the will to use that force, but also a clear political objective. 24 One
civilian official described the dominant view: "Senior military leaders
don't want another 'dirty little war' where the President gets them into a
conflict and then leaves them there. "25
Why is this such a problem? According to Harry Summers, Jr.,
"[the Vietnam Syndrome ...had] far-reaching consequences, for while
American military power remained formidable after Vietnam, its
military authority declined precipitously." 26 In fact, the Vietnam
syndrome poses a serious threat to military legitimacy in a democratic
system .
The legitimacy of the military in a democracy lies with the people.
The military establishment in the United States cannot operate outside
of the public eye and cannot lose the public trust. 27 As General
Frederick C. Weyand once explained,

23 Naylor

24Ibid.

25 Locher interview .
26 Harry Summers, On

Strategy I/ : A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War._
(New York: Dell 1992) 7.
27 To insure the Army never went to war without the public trust, DoD
implemented the Total Force Policy in 1974. This policy, championed by
then Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams, placed the reserves on the same
warfighting level as active component forces. For a thorough investigation
of the ideas behind Total Force, see Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and
Active Reserve Integration in Wartime," Parameters, Summer 1991 pp. 35 50.
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Vietnam was a reaffirmation of the peculiar
relationship between the American Army and the
American people. When the American Army is
committed, the people are committed; when the
American people lose their commitment it is futile to
try and keep the Army committed. In the final
analysis, the American Army is not so much an arm
of the Executive Branch as it is an arm of the
American people. 28
The concern about public support during operations was validated
following the 3 October firefight between American Rangers and
Somali gangs. The deaths of eighteen Americans dictated a fundamental
change in US policy towards Somalia and the establishment of a
withdrawal date. One cannot help but draw the conclusion that the
change in policy was related to a change in feelings by the American
public about the war.
Although American officers join the Army to uphold and defend the
Constitution, they do not want to fall victim to the vacillations of
elected representatives who may change their policy on a moments'
notice. Any form of operations other than war includes the aspect of
political will. This is what worries officers the most. Officer's specific
questions include: Will there be adequate rules of engagement to protect
friendly forces and conduct operations? Will the operation be run from
the tactical headquarters or from the Pentagon? Will the operation have
Congressional and Executive branch sanction? These questions
demonstrate the complexity of the political aspects of operations other
than war , and serve as speedbumps to the rapid acceptance of any
operation other than warfighting .
Before any external military operation is conducted, the military
desires that the government determine the focus and rules of engagement
for the mission and that the government ensure support for the mission .
If this support and consensus are not present, the armed force will
remain skeptical of the operation.
Paradigm Shift:

The Genesis of Doctrinal Change

Even before the demise of the USSR and the advent
crisis, the Army was planning to reduce and reorganize
disappearance of the threat in Europe merely hastened this
deepened the force and budget cuts. Despite the USSR's

of the Iraqi
itself . The
process and
dissolution,

2 8Fred C. Weyand and Harry G. Summers , Jr., 'Vietnam Myths and

American Realities , " CDRS CALL (Washington D.C. : Department of the
Army Pamphlet 360 -828 (July-August 1976), p. 7, quoted from On Strategy,
p . 75.
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the challenge of low intensity conflict and of regional crises remained.
Much of the debate in the post-Soviet period focuses on confronting and
prioritizing these remaining threats.
As early as October 1989, General Colin Powell, then Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had come to the conclusion that the reforms
initiated by Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev would usher in a new
security era for the United States.29 Consequently, Powell immediately
set to work defining the new environment that the United States would
face in the decade of the 1990s.
Despite Powell's broad vision of the potential for change, much of
the thrust of the new strategy focused on the mid-intensity dangers of
future Iraqi-style wars brought on by the proliferation of hightechnology weapons and weapons of mass destruction. 30 There was no
widespread agreement among the various leaders in the services and the
legislature. None of the service chiefs immediately agreed with Powell.
All of them argued for a future similar to the past. 31 The Army's
initial plan, founded in concepts of total victory, envisioned reducing
the force only down to 625,000, mostly in response to the anticipated
results of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. 32
The result of this tumult in the strategic view of the security
environment was that low intensity conflict entered the mainstream for
all of the services. 33 The Navy and Marine Corps even adopted a
"littoral" strategy, or as some call it, a "brown water" strategy, that
29 Don M. Snider, Strategy, Forces and Budgets : DominanJ Influences in
Executive Decision Making, Post -Cold War, 1989-91 (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993) 8-9. See also
Harry E. Rothmann, Forging A New National Military Strategy in a Post Cold War World: A Perspective from the JoinJ Staff (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992) 7. Both Snider and
Rothmann were Army colonels working on the production of strategy
statements in this period.
30 In the Aspen speech, Bush spoke of "renegade regimes" and of 20
countries with chemical warfare capabilities, and another 15 that would
soon possess ballistic missile technologies. See the reprint of the speech
in Cheney, 1991, 131-134 .
31 Snider 13. In fact the service chiefs asked for 2% real growth in the
defense budget for several years.
32 Vuono was successful in the early meetings with Powell, pegging the
Army size to a total U.S. force in Europe of 150,000. See Snider 15. See
also statements by Secretary of the Army Michael P. W. Stone and Chief of
Staff of the Army General Carl E. Vuono, 29 March 1990 in U.S. Senate,
Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1991, Hearings before
the Committee
on Appropriations,
101st cong., 2d sess ., pt. 3
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1990) 3, 17-18.
33Much of the following is adopted from Rick Waddell, 'The Army and
Peacetime Low Intensity Conflict, 1961-1993: The Process of Peripheral
and Fundamental Military Change," diss ., Columbia, 1993.
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foresaw the future in terms of force projection and not maritime
dominance, which was taken as a given. 34
The Army also reconfigured its thinking. As Army Chief of Staff
Gordon Sullivan put it, "America needs a different model by which to
raise, equip, organize, educate, train, fight, coordinate, and sustain her
armed forces." 35 Sullivan also suggested two ways of viewing the use
of force: "war," and "operations other than war." 36 Sullivan maintained
that this new view of warfare was necessary to replace the negative aim
of containment -- stopping the spread of Soviet power -- with a positive
aim: "to promote democracy, regional stability, and economic
prosperity." 37 Again this policy reflects attempts to use force for a
'good' cause. Additionally, this shift allows the Army to get smaller,
yet more active at home in all manner of civic undertakings from
disaster relief to the vaccinating of inner city children, thus contributing
to "the challenges of domestic regeneration." 38
Thus, the consequence of Sullivan's views, which were different
from those of his predecessor, was that the Army would be much more
active at home and abroad, despite reducing its size by at least 33% . In
1993 the Army had 590,000 soldiers on active duty. Under the new
policies, about 25,000 were engaged in deployments to more than sixty
countries on any given day. 39 This was double the amount of 1992,
and was slated to rise, while the Army's end strength was slated to fall.
Almost all of these deployments would fall into the categories of low
intensity conflict. To respond to these changes in the security
environment and in the national strategy, the Army completed, or
planned, major changes in doctrine.

34 See Sean O'Keefe, Admiral Frank Kelso, General C.E. Mundy, From
the Sea : Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century (Washington,
D.C.: Department of the Navy, September 1992). The authors are,
respectively , Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operation s, and
Commandant of the Marine Corps.
35 General Gordon R. Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel James M. Dubik,
Land Warfare in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, 1993) 8.
36 I will continue to use the phrase "low intensity conflict" except when
referring directly to official Army publications using the new phrase.
37 Sullivan and Dubik 8.
38 Sullivan and Dubik 5. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs, Deborah Roche Lee , spoke of "utilizing military forces, and
reserves in particular, to try to add value and give back and meet needs in
America that are otherwise going unmet." See William Mathews, "New
Chief Sees Increased Role for Reserves," Army Times, 21 June 1993, 20.
39 Sullivan 3. Army end strength is slated to reach 545,000 by end of
Fiscal Year 1995 in September 1994.
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Doctrine
In late 1990, the Anny issued a new edition of its low-intensity
warfare doctrine FM (Field Manual) 100-20, titled Military Operations
in Low Intensity Conflict. As will be noted below, the new manual
was almost dead upon arrival; however it did represent a significant
improvement over both the last edition for 1981 and an interim field
circular from 1986.
The 1990 edition retained four broad categories of conflict from the
mid-1980s: insurgency, terrorism, peacekeeping, and peacetime
contingency operations. The writers addressed in detail the political
environment of each of the different categories, emphasizing the often
highly-charged political nature of low intensity conflict, and the everpresent ethical, moral, and legal dilemmas. 40 A significant
modification to the old manual is the inclusion, as an "imperative," of
the notion of "legitimacy," defined as "the willing acceptance of the
right of a government to govern or of a group or agency to make and
enforce decisions." 41 Success in all low intensity operations, according
to the manual, depends upon encouraging and sustaining legitimacy. 42
With this manual, the Army exposed its concept of low intensity
conflict well beyond the near total focus on counterinsurgency of the
earlier doctrinal publications. Yet, because the topic of low intensity
conflict was treated so lightly in the main doctrinal manual in
existence, the 1986 edition of FM 100-5 Operations. the new FM 10020 was not taken seriously. Moreover, the new FM 100-20 was put
into revision almost upon being issued.
The Chief of Staff, General Carl Vuono, and his doctrinal writers at
TRADOC, determined that having two doctrines, one for war fighting
and another for low intensity conflict, no longer made sense. 43 The
chief doctrinal writer for the 1993 edition of FM 100-5, Colonel James
McDonough, maintained that all Army operations deserved treatment in
the new manual. 44 Moreover, McDonough thought that low intensity
40 See FM 100-20, 1990, pages 1-2 through 1-4, 1-8 and 1-9, and
Appendix B ''The Law and Low Intensity Conflict."
41 FM 100-20 1-6.
42 In reflection of the experience of the 1980s, the manual specifically
distinguished
between
supporting
insurgency
and supporting
counterinsurgency, while still disproportionately emphasizing the latter .
The bulk of the second chapter addresses the general political environment
of insurgency.
Three of the six append ice s are devoted to
counterinsurgency. See FM 100-20, 1990 chapter 2, and Appendices A, D,
E. U.S. support for insurgency is covered on 2-17 and 2-18. U.S. supporl
to counterinsurgency is covered on 2-18 through 2-25.
43 Council Interview.
44 Interview with Colonel McDonough, West Point, NY, 17 June 1992.
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conflict should be seen "as part of wider, general theory of war." 45 To
encompass this wider theory, "Doctrine should address nonconventional
operations in operations short of war, during Limited hostile action and
in conditions of war and its aftennath." 46 Also, "Future doctrine should
be expanded to incorporate our evolving missions in areas such as
stability operations, nation assistance and contraband flow."47
Controversy also arose over the definition and scope of low
intensity conflict with President Bush's 2 August 1990 speech at
Aspen, Colorado. Bush spoke of "peacetime engagement," which
observers took to mean, variously, a new security strategy for the
United States, a component of a new strategy, or a new name for low
intensity conflict. Where the Bush speech seemed to refer to the whole
breadth of American foreign policy, Secretary of Defense Cheney in his
1991 annual report called peacetime engagement "a strategy that seeks
to counteract violence and to promote nation-building. "48 Among the
crafters of the U.S. statements on national strategy and military
strategy, "peacetime engagement" was in competition with "active
presence" and "forward presence" as names for U.S. activities abroad.49
The resulting interagency confusion, complicated with the
organizational focus on a definition of victory, made writing the Anny
doctrine very difficult. 50 Some officers "were troubled to meet
participants who had 'an aversion to the term "LIC"' and so were ready
to ignore 'all excellent concepts and useful doctrine [extant low
intensity conflict] in the process'." 51 Reminiscent of the long-standing
disagreement over war fighting versus low intensity conflict, the Anny
45 McDonough Interview . Also interview with Major Rick Brennan,
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Operation s and Plans,
Strategic Plans and Policy Division, May 1992.
46 James R. McDonough, "Building the New FM 100-5: Process and
Product," Military Review , October 1991, 12.
47 McDonough 8. See also General John W. Foss, "Advent of the
Nonlinear Battlefield : AirLand Battle -Future," Army, February 1991, 22,
24. Foss was the commander of TRADOC, the organization responsible for
writing Army doctrine. Foss makes the same point about including low
intensity conflict in the capstone manual.
48 Cheney, Annual Report, 1991. 6. See also Thomas W. Crouch ,
Historical Report of the Army-Air Force Center for Low intensity Conflict
(A-AF CUC) , 1 January 1991-30 June 1991 (Langley Air Force Base, VA:
CUC Reference Co!Jection) 43-44. Hereafter cited as A-AF CLIC.
49 See Don M. Snider, Strategy 4 .
SO Thomas W. Crouch, Historical Report of the Army-Air Force Center
for Low intensity Conflict (A -AF CUC), 1 July 1991-31 December 1991
(Lanfley Air Force Base, VA: CUC Reference Collection) 34.
5 A -AF CUC, 1 July 1991-31 December 1991 34. See Supporting
Document 83 for the trip report within which these observations were
recorded.

160 I The Journal of Political Science

From Paradigm to Paradigm Shift
argued for a narrow interpretation of low intensity conflict that
encompassed only activities not involving combat. 52 Ultimately , the
Army adopted a new name for low intensity conflict - "operations other
than war."
Perhaps as a result of the confusion, the 1993 edition of FM 100-5
exhibits certain discontinuities. However, the manual does adequately
address the concepts discussed earlier of victory, violence, and Vietnam.
As promised by McDonough, the manual propounded a unified vision
of Army operations which fully incorporated what was known as low
intensity conflict. The process of rewriting FM 100-5 Operations had
begun before Desert Shield and Desert Storm.53 In the aftermath of the
Gulf War, the rewriting began anew to incorporate lessons learned and
the new military strategy . Consequently, the opening statement is a
direct reflection of the changed strategy: "(This manual] addresses
fundamentals of a force-projection army with forward-deployed
forces." 54 Furthermore, the manual "is the authoritative guide to how
the Army forces fight wars and conduct operations other than war." 55
Yet, the manual quickly assures the reader that
Winning wars is the primary purpose of the doctrine
in this manual .... The manual also addresses the
related fields of joint and combined operations,
logistics, the environment of combat, and operations
other than war. But, its primary focus is war fighting
and how commanders put all the elements together to
achieve victory at least cost to American soldiers .56
With these statements, it becomes clear that low intensity conflict, now
called operations other than war, had made it into the mainstream of
Army thinking.
Unlike joint and combined operations , respectively operations with
sister U.S. services and with foreign militaries, or logistics, the vast
majority of operations other than war are not directly linked to war
fighting. The manual's writers seem uncomfortable with the difference,
proclaiming
in one instance,
that "the spirit of the

52 Lieutenant Colonel Clifton J. Everton and Lieutenant Colonel Arba
Williamson , "Trip Report," 24 December 1991, 2. This is Supporting
Document 83 to A-AF CLIC, 1 July 1991-31 December 1991.
53 Telephone interview with General (retired) John W. Foss, 5 August
1993 .
54 FM 100-5 Operation s (Washington , D.C.: Department of the Army,
June 1993) iv.
55 FM 100-5, 1993, V .
56 FM 100-5, 1993, V.
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offense ...characterizes the American soldier." 57 This directly conflicts
with some of requirements for low intensity missions and reflects the
'manager of violence' spirit
The writers wrestled with the notion of how to handle anything
less than war fighting. In a subsection titled "The Range of Military
Operations," the manual states,
The Army classifies its activities during peacetime
and conflict as operations other than war. During
peacetime, the US attempts to influence world events
through those actions that routinely occur between
nations. Conflict is characterized by hostilities to
secure strategic objectives. The last environment that of war - involves the use of force in combat
operations against an armed enemy. 58
Clearly there is confusion here between conflict, combat,
hostilities, and war. This causes concern to many officers, for these
definitions provide doctrinal guidelines concerning the use of force and
the conditions for victory. The ambiguities no doubt reflect the lack of
agreement among the writers and reviewers of the manual. One clue to
the dividing line between these terms comes from the views of General
Sullivan, who became Chief of Staff in mid-1991:
The concept of "war" is usually understood in terms
of conventional combat: the armies of one nationstate or alliances of nation-states fighting those of
another. Every other act of violence, use of force, or
form of hostility is characterized as "operations other
than war." 59
However, his distinctions would allow any interstate combat to be
called war, no matter the level of violence or casualties, thus allowing
the definitional problem of the "small war" to creep back in. Finally,
the manual's definitions also lump low intensity conflict missions,
which all involve at least some chance of combat, into the same
category as civic missions involving no chance of combat whatsoever .
While the 1993 edition of Operations continues and even expands
the conceptual fuzziness of low intensity conflict, it also breaks new
ground. It brings low intensity missions into the mainstream, giving
them near-equal billing with war fighting. The manual notes that a
regional commander-in-chief may be conducting peacetime and conflict
57
58

FM 100-5, 1993, 2-0.
FM 100-5, 1993, 2-0. Emphasis original.

59 Sullivan and Dubik 8.
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operations in one part of his region simultaneously with a war in
another part 60 The manual then devotes an entire chapter to the topic
of operations other than war, heavy with highlighted, inset references to
"operations other than war" which have been conducted at home and
abroad since 1990, such as support to civil authorities in the aftermath
of Hurricane Andrew in Florida, a nation-assistance mission involving
immunizations in Cameroon, and Operation Provide Comfort in
Northern Iraq.
The Army lumped these operations together with those that
involve the potential of combat, and those that involve small-scale
com bat. 61 Another officer suggested that the Clinton administration
officials on the National Security Council were uncomfortable with the
very notion of "war" and "conflict," preferring to call all operations,
absent a declaration of war, "peace operations. "62 Hence, one can
perhaps surmise the reason for the shift away from low intensity
conflict to "operations other than war." This category has now
officially grown broader and more diffuse.63
The manual notes the necessity of including OOTW in the
capstone doctrine because "Army forces have participated in operations
other than war in support of national interests throughout its
history." 64 And, in an even grander sense, "The entire Army .. .is
involved daily in operations other than war. "65 What does the manual
say of the conduct of these operations? Continuing the progress begun
in the 1990 edition of FM 100-20, the chapter highlights the
importance of legitimacy, restraint, and perseverance: "In operations
other than war, victory comes more subtly than in war. Disciplined
forces, measured responses, and patience are essential to successful
outcomes." 66 In further contrast with the FM 100-5 manuals of the
1970s and 1980s, with their concentration on speedy victory by massed
maneuvering of armored units, in operations other than war "the
activities of relatively small units can have operational, and even
strategic impact." 67
60
61

FM 100-5, 1993, 2-0.
For the differences in these two categories of conflict, refer to chapter
2 above.
62 Remarks not made for attribution .
63 In March 1993, the Center for Low Intensity Conflict was preparing a
draft manual on "Military Support to Civil Authorities ." The manual's
topics included use of military forces in riot situations, natural disasters,
combating the importation of illicit narcotics, re -building the national
infrastructure, and using military personnel to provide medical care and
education services to American inner cities. McGrew interview.
64 FM 100-5, 1993, 13-0.
65 FM 100-5, 1993, 13-2.
66 FM 100-5, 1993, 13-1.
67 FM 100-5, 1993, 13-2.
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The concern for perseverance and restraint in the ·chapter on
operations other than war seems odd in comparison to the manual's
remaining focus on speed, maneuver, and firepower. In a manual that
proclaims that the American soldier is imbued with an offensive spirit,
notions such as patience, subtlety, and measured response are an odd fit.
The aggressiveness and lack of hesitation inherent in an offensive spirit
clearly conflict with the reticence and judiciousness inherent in the idea
that "the use of overwhelming force may complicate the process toward
the Army's stated objectives." Certainly the training required of the
soldier faced with an operation other than war would be more similar to
that of a police officer than of a combat soldier. Yet, the manual,
reflecting the "Any good soldier ... " mindset, simply states, "In
preparing to fight the nation's wars, the Army develops the leadership,
organizations, equipment, discipline, and skills for a variety of
operations other than war."68
This edition of FM 100-5 breaks new ground in its treatment of
low intensity missions. The nagging discontinuities in its treatment of
the primary purpose of the Army - war - and its treatment of the
activities in which the Army engages daily are no doubt a reflection of
the debate mentioned above over the scope and definition of low
intensity conflict. That the topic has been brought into the capstone
manual is also a direct reflection of the perceived changes in the security
environment and the missions that the Army was required to perform as
the manual was being written.
With the new capstone doctrine in place, the Army began work on
FM 100-23 Peace Operations, which was to be the replacement for the
1990 edition of FM 100-20. In keeping with the categories of
activities set forth in FM 100-5, this new manual will address aJI
activities not included in "war," and will significantly expand the
treatment of peacekeeping and peace enforcement in light of operations
in Somalia and Macedonia. 69
68 FM I 00 -5, 1993, 13-0. When soldiers are used merely for their
technical capabilities,
absent any potential for combat, such as
vaccinations or filling potholes, it is undoubtedly true that their technical
training and their existing organizational structures suffice . However,
introduce the potential for combat and the question rapidly arises, "how are
the soldiers trained to respond?" Training soldiers to respond to airborne or
armored assaults is different than training them to respond to snipers,
ambushes, or assaults by irregulars.
69 Interview with Major Rick Brennan, Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Democracy, Human Rights, and Peacekeeping, 14 July 1993.
Brennan had moved on 12 July from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
of the Army for Operations and Plans, Strategic Plans and Policy Division
where he was responsible for Army policy on peacekeeping and peace
enforcement.
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Conclusion
In the 1990s, a vision of warfare based on the Desert Shield and
Desert Storm experience, as the armor traditionalists would have liked
it, proved to be too politically unpopular with the civilian reformers in
Congress and the executive branch, especially in the Clinton
administration, which did not perceive such scenarios as credible. In
such an administration, given a desire to promote democratic
institutions abroad, the desire to use the Army for nation assistance,
humanitarian relief, and low level military-to-military contacts came to
be the major policy thrust. 70
By the end of 1991, under pressure from civilians, power shifted to
officers who might work to overcome organizational constraints. These
officers might be termed the visionaries. Had the Army remained
dominated by traditionalists, it would have found itself hard pressed to
respond well to the missions it was given in an era of budgetary
constraints. To meet the new missions, and avoid a disgraceful failure,
the Army no longer has the luxury of dealing with such missions on
the margin. It has to confront them directly.
Evidence is not yet available, but a reasonable assumption is that
one of the reasons for the selection of General Sullivan as General
Vuono's replacement was Sullivan's willingness to embrace nontraditional missions. Moreover, the Clinton administration's choice for
Powell's replacement was General John Shalikashvili, an officer with a
background as an adviser in Vietnam, and who commanded the large
humanitarian
intervention
in northern Iraq.
The Clinton
administration's determination to use the military in non-traditional
ways made officers who could think intellectually about the subject of
low intensity conflict all the more important. Yet, these officers were
not in any sense "mavericks."
The debate within the Army, though, is not yet over. The Army
may be at a threshold of change where it must seriously reconsider its
focus and core. The Army must understand its organizational
boundaries and seek to modify them towards OOTW. Thus, one needs
to understand the process of change, and its likely outcomes. Absent
clear priorities, a consistent effort from civilian leaders, or Army
involvement in missions such as those in Somalia and the Balkans,
intergroup conflict based upon organizational discomfort with OOTW
could continue in a smaller Army, perhaps at a dysfunctional level.
Fundamental change will become concrete when the Army devises
lists of tasks for each of the various missions within the concept of
OOTW, requires units to train on those tasks at all levels from
individual to higher level "war games," and when the officer corps
70 The Bush administration had already emphasized these as "Forward
Presence Operations ."

Volume 22 1994

I 165

Turregano and Waddell
becomes comfortable with the concept of OOTW. By 1993 the Army
had begun to move in these directions, but was not yet there. Hence,
we have only change in progress with an as yet undefined outcome.
Finally, officers in the armed forces must accept Samuel
Huntington's adage:
The purpose of military forces is combat,
that is to deter and to defeat the enemies of the United
States; that is their central mission, their raison
d'etre, the only justification for expending resources
on their creation and maintenance. The forces created
for that mission, however, can and throughout our
history have been employed in non-combat nonmilitary uses.
The task now facing officers is how to form an organizational
mentality that incorporates the idea of victory, the management of
violence, and the support of the American people into a comprehensive
definition of Operations Other than War.
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